




Punitive damage awards have increased dramatically in recent years.
My study of civil trial judgments in the courts of Cook County, Illinois
(the Chicago metropolitan area) shows that the number of punitive
damage judgments in the years 1978 and 1979 (the most recent years of
the sample) were greater than that of any year since 1959 (the first year
of the sample). Indeed, punitive damage awards in these years were,
respectively, four and two and one-half times as large as the average
annual number of punitive damage judgments from 1959 to 1979.' Pu-
nitive damages have been awarded in Cook County now in virtually all
areas of civil liability, from street hazard and road construction cases to
product liability, malpractice, and landlord-tenant cases. Since the late
1960's, there has occurred a steady increase in the number of punitive
damage judgments in business tort and-unusually enough--contract
breach cases. Of course, this increase in jury awards comprises only
some very small fraction of the total sums paid out to parties claiming
punitive damages.2
Professor Ellis's excellent treatment of punitive damages3 demon-
strates that there are no available theoretical justifications for these de-
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1. In 1978 and 1979, juries awarded punitive damages, respectively, in 26 and 15 cases. The
average number of annual punitive damage judgments between 1959 and 1979 was 6.1, although 4
judgments or less were awarded in 10 of the 21 years and 3 or less each year between 1959 and
1966. These numbers are so small that I regard the changes as no more than suggestive. Statisti-
cal significance would be misleading.
2. Typically, less than 5% of claims are litigated to a verdict. H. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF
COURT 136 (1970). Because they involve amounts greater than the average, punitive damage
claims are likely to be litigated more frequently. Id. at 216-17.
3. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law ofPunitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1982).
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velopments. No new theories of justice have been discovered to
generate more frequent punitive awards. Nor has economic theory de-
veloped new reasons. The narrow economic justifications for punitive
damages are now commonplace.4 Moreover, there are no reasons to
believe either that the level of malice or the magnitude of losses from
intentional or reckless behavior has increased in recent years.- How,
then, can we explain the great increase in punitive damage awards?
6
Let me offer as a hypothesis that the increase in punitive damage
judgments is related to the theory of enterprise liability. The theory of
enterprise liability provides in its most simple form that corporate en-
terprise ought to be responsible for injuries caused by products that it
places in commerce or for losses suffered from the pursuit of its com-
mercial interests. The acceptance of enterprise liability theory, in my
view, is responsible for the general increase over the past two decades
in the liability of manufacturers for product related losses, for example,
the adoption of the standard of strict liability for product defects and
increasing restrictions on the defenses available to manufacturers.7 Ac-
ceptance of the theory, furthermore, may explain the large rise during
the same period in the number of private antitrust actions and in their
rate of success.8 A relationship between enterprise liability theory and
the increase in punitive damage judgments is not immediately implau-
sible. My study shows an increase in punitive damage judgments in
trial courts in actions involving harms attributed to business practices; 9
the Ellis paper is strewn with citations to extraordinary punitive judg-
ments in favor of consumers against manufacturers, small dealers
against large.
Nevertheless, the relationship between enterprise liability theory
4. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 142-43 (2d ed. 1977).
5. In 1978, Chicago jurors awarded. punitive damages in 5 assault cases. In 1977 and 1979,
however, the number of awards equalled the annual average for the 21 years: 1.
6. Not even scholars possessing the imaginative power to explain every development in the
law as efficient can tell us why the number of punitive damage awards has increased. See Landes
& Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, I INT'L REV. OF L. & ECON. 127, 135-39
(198 1) (proposing that punitive damages be awarded only for intentional torts involving deliberate
wrongdoing or recklessness, but failing to explain the current increase in the number of punitive
damage awards).
7. I discuss the intellectual history of enterprise liability in some more detail, infra text
accompanying notes 14-34. See Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J.
1297, 1299-1302 (1981); G. Priest, Sindell: Its Origin and its Future (1982) (unpublished manu-
script on file with the Southern Caif/ornia Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Sindell].
8. See W. BAXTER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST 23-24 (R. Tollison ed. 1980)
(numerical data on the disposition of private antitrust cases).
9. These include, among others, contract interference, fraud, and contract breach (involv-
ing insurance contracts, personal service contracts, the sale of property, and even debt).
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and punitive damages is not entirely clear. Although many legal schol-
ars have encouraged the extension of enterprise liability,"0 none, to my
acquaintance, has specifically addressed punitive awards. The litera-
ture has focused on the assignment of liability to manufacturers and
other corporate enterprise. Once manufacturers are held liable, com-
pensatory damages generally have been regarded as sufficient." What
further purpose would be served by punitive awards?' 2
One central assumption of enterprise liability theory, if taken seri-
ously, can justify punitive awards. Indeed, the assumption justifies the
unlimited extension of liability to corporate enterprise. Although some
scholars over the years have criticized aspects of enterprise liability the-
ory,13 this central assumption of the theory has remained unchallenged.
Professor Ellis' study builds upon the same empirical assumption and is
similarly incomplete. As a consequence, Ellis', as well as most other
legal and economic studies of enterprise liability, have inadequately in-
formed courts about the implications of extending liability, including
the implications of increasing the availability of punitive damage
awards.
II.
The empirical assumption accepted by Professor Ellis, by most legal
and economic students of enterprise liability, and by the courts is that
consumers have no role to play in the avoidance of injuries from prod-
uct use or other corporate activity. 4 The level of safety (or, say, of
contract breach) is determined solely by investments of the corporate
entity, whether manufacturer or insurer. There is a distinguished his-
tory of support for this assumption. It was a major project in the 1940's
10. E.g., James, General Products: Should Manufacturers be Liable Without Negligence?, 24
TENN. L. REv. 923 (1957) (arguing that strict liability is preferred over a system of liability based
on fault whenever there is an enterprise or activity, beneficial to many, that takes an inevitable
accident toll of human life).
II. Compensatory damages will encourage tortfeasors to prevent injuries when the costs of
prevention are less than the expected losses.
12. I ignore in this Comment arguments that punitive damages ought to compensate for the
victim's litigation costs, discussed in Ellis, supra note 3, at 10-12. It is unlikely that the changes
over time in punitive damage awards are closely correlated with changes in the level of attorneys'
fees.
13. R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODucTs LIABILITY LAW 190-93 (1980) (allocation of loss based
on shared expectations and liability imposed only for latent defects in a product which cause
injury in ordinary use; assumption of the risk and contributory negligence defenses should be
allowed).
14. With respect to products liability, other related assumptions are that manufacturers or
other enterprises do not compete over product safety, but act to minimize obligations for losses.
Sindell, supra note 7, at 4. The assumption that consumers play no role in preventing injuries,
however, is sufficient to justify punitive damages. See infra text accompanying notes 36-43.
1982]
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and 1950's of lawyers urging the adoption of principles of enterprise
liability in the products field to convince the public, the academy, and
the courts that there was nothing that a consumer could do to prevent
product injuries. Professors James and Dickinson showed (asserted)
that consumer fear of injury was sufficient to elicit maximum consumer
investments in safety. 5 Professor James, citing unnamed "studies of
human behavior," showed (asserted) that accident prevention by indi-
viduals was insignificant in comparison to prevention by "institutions
and organized groups."' 6 Professor Kessler showed (asserted) that
product consumers and insureds were powerless in comparison to man-
ufacturers or insurers and that the terms of product warranties and of
insurance contracts were unaffected by competitive pressures or con-
sumer preferences.1
7
The courts accepted these empirical characterizations' 8 and the
policy recommendations that followed from them. Most legal and eco-
nomic scholars accepted the characterizations as well. My colleague,
Guido Calabresi, in his very influential book, The Costs of Accidents,
published in 1970, defined an analytical framework incorporating the
possibility of consumer investments in safety.' 9 But, to demonstrate his
approach, Calabresi consistently presents examples in which the
method of reducing the accident rate is some technological investment
alone (which the manufacturer is surely in a better position to pro-
vide).2" In The Costs ofAccidents, the role of accident law in spreading
15. James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness andAccident Law, 63 HARV. L. REV. 769, 780
(1950).
16. James, supra note 10, at 923.
17. Kessler, Contracts ofAdhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM.
L. REv. 629, 636-37 (1943); Kessler, Forces Shaping the Insurance Contract, 374 INS. L.J. 151, 152
(1954). Kessler's theory and its influence is discussed in more detail in Priest, supra note 7, at
1299-1302.
18. E.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 260-64, 391 P.2d 168, 170-72, 37
Cal. Rptr. 896, 898-900 (1964); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 377-84, 161
A.2d 69, 79-84 (1960).
19. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). Calabresi accepts and endorses a pol-
icy of enterprise liability. Id. at 53-54, 84, 162-65, 245, 252, 261. Nevertheless, the book's analysis
is sufficiently general to incorporate other policies.
20. Id. at 73-75 ("new-style" brakes), 137-38 (hardness of bumpers), 139 (hardness of bump-
ers), 156 (type of brakes), 259 (hardness of bumpers). In virtually all other examples, Calabresi
pictures the assignment of liability not as leading to greater care by consumers, drivers, or pedest-
rians, but as influencing only the levels of activity of these groups. Thus, assigning liability to
teenage drivers or pedestrians will not lead to more careful driving or walking, but only to less
driving and walking. .d. at 73, 139, 145, 148, 153-54, 156, 177, 182, 195, 213 (2 examples), 217-18,
276. In the entire book, the only examples given suggesting that victims might be in a better
position than injurers to take specific precautions to avoid losses are where the victim knows that
-he is particularly sensitive to injury, such as suffering an allergy, id. at 163, or where the victim
places a particularly high personal value on some aspect of the loss. Id. at 223. The single empiri-
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losses dominates-and, according to Calabresi, ought to dominate-its
role in reducing the accident rate.2 Of course, accident law can suc-
cessfully spread losses only if manufacturers and other enterprises (who
are able to add an insurance premium to the price of the product) are
generally liable for losses.
Acceptance of the assumption that consumers cannot take precau-
tions is not always explicit. Yet, even Professor Posner's discussion of
products liability in Economic Analysis of Law presumes no important
investments by consumers in reducing accidents (although oddly it con-
siders seriously that consumers may be risk preferrers) and emphasizes
the extent to which consumers are uninformed about product risks. 2
Today, technical papers discussing aspects of enterprise liability rou-
tinely regard consumer investments in safety as unimportant or of sub-
sidiary importance. It is commonplace to observe footnotes explaining
that the analysis "abstracts from moral hazard.' ' 23 More complete arti-
cles typically discuss first accidents whose occurrence is affected only
by injurers, relegating to subordinate sections accidents whose occur-
rence is affected by both injurers and victims.2 4
The implications of enterprise liability where consumers make no
investments in safety are straightforward and now'well-known. The
most common, but mistakenly simplistic, conclusion is that safer prod-
ucts will result z.2  According to this view, manufacturers invest in prod-
uct safety in order to avoid liability; thus, the greater the liability, the
cal datum presented in the book, upon which the book's theory heavily relies, is the claim that the
number of workplace safety precautions was substantially increased after liability for workplace
injuries was shifted from employees to employers by workmen's compensation acts. Id. at 245.
Calabresi presents neither data nor a reference to data supporting this claim.
21. Eg., id. at 37, 64, 92, 96, 164. Calabresi consistently conflates risk distribution with
income redistribution. Id. at 47-48, 50, 55, 63, 92. Curiously, Calabresi's insistence on income
redistribution as a goal of accident law derives from his acceptance of enterprise liability as a
social mandate. Calabresi reasons that since the society has accepted enterprise liability, the lia-
bility system must be employed to redistribute income. Id. at 52-55, 164. Thus, the failure of the
fault system to redistribute income becomes, in Calabresi's terms, a "secondary cost" of accidents.
Id. at 39-64.
22. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 135-37.
23. Eg., Spence, Consumer Mispreceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REV.
ECON. STUD. 56.1, 566, 572 n.5 (1977). But see Oi, The Economics of Product Safety, 4 BELL J.
ECON. 3, 8-19, 25 nn.41 & 44 (1973) (consumer investments treated as significant).
24. For recent examples, see Polinsky, Strict Liability v. Negligence in a Market Setting, 70
AM. ECON. REv. 363, 363 & n.3, 367 (1980); Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 1, 6-9, 17-22 (1980). This sequence has more than expositional importance. It confers
significance upon the example of the unilateral, comer-solution in a context (where the effect
studied is the rate of activity) in which there exist no unilateral, only bilateral, cases.
25. E.g., Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv.
791, 799 (1966).
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greater will be the investment in safety. This view must concede that,
relative to a freely negotiated standard of liability,2 6 the product will be
"too safe" given consumer preferences. z7 Its price will be higher and its
sales lower. Nonetheless, the product will be safer.
More careful analyses of the problem have shown that these impli-
cations are not correct. Where a manufacturer and a consumer have
negotiated28 for some level of manufacturer investment in safety, that
level will be optimal and will not be influenced by the legal standard of
liability.29 However, support has been found on other grounds for the
expansion of liability. Following Professor Posner, it is commonly pre-
sumed that legal rules are defined to achieve efficiency. 30 Thus, various
prominent theorists assume that the law has carefully defined those ac-
tions that it regards as negligent or contributorily negligent in ways that
optimize costs and benefits.3 When it is assumed that standards of
care are set at efficient levels, it has been shown (and it is the conven-
tional wisdom) that either a negligence or a strict liability regime is
efficient.32 Strict liability is preferable, however, if neither consumer
investments in preventing injuries nor the extent to which the consumer
uses the product is affected by the legal standard, because manufactur-
ers will then take the level of activity into account.33 Strict liability
may be even more strongly endorsed if consumers underestimate risks,
because without the standard consumers will purchase products too
dangerous for their own good.34
These models reinforce the enterprise liability approach in two
subtle ways. First, the initial assumption that negligence and contribu-
tory negligence are defined efficiently is only plausible where there is
26. Consumers may "negotiate" with manufacturers over the level of product safety by exer-
cising preferences for product design and quality or for warranty protection. For a description of
these processes, see Priest, supra note 7, at 1346-47. For evidence of their effect, see Id. at 1328-46.
27. Professor Posner derives this result, but does so from his assumption that consumers are
risk preferrers. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 136-37.
28. See supra note 26.
29. That is, the manufacturer will invest in safety until the cost of such investment equals the
benefit in reduction of consumer losses. Beyond this point it will cost the manufacturer less to pay
damages than to make the product even safer. A change in liability that yet allows a contractual
reassignment will not change either the cost of safety investment or the frequency of consumer
losses and so will not change the manufacturer's incentive to invest. See R. POSNER, supra note 4,
at 135-36, 137-38; Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 2-10 (1960) (if market
transactions are costless, a change in liability will not affect resource allocation).
30. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 15-192.
31. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 24, at 22-25; Polinsky, supra note 24, at 363.
32. Shavell, supra note 24, at 34; Polinsky, supra note 24, at 363.
33. Shavell, supra note 24, at 3; Polinsky, supra note 24, at 366.
34. Spence, supra note 23, at 561; Shavell, supra note 24, at 4; Polinsky, supra note 24, at 366.
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some link between the legal order and efficiency. This assumption sug-
gests-although the conclusion is never explicitly stated-that the uni-
versal adoption of the strict liability standard itself is efficient. As
mentioned earlier,35 the adoption of the strict liability standard can
only be efficient when it does not influence the level of consumer in-
vestments in safety, most clearly when consumers make no relevant in-
vestments in safety. Second, because these models regard consumers as
always behaving optimally, consumer investments in safety are irrele-
vant to the issue of liability. The comparison of strict liability and neg-
ligence regimes proceeds as if consumers have no influence on the
production of safety over the margin relevant to liability.36
Professor Ellis' discussion of the effects of punitive damage liabil-
ity, while acknowledging the theoretical refinements, recalls the earlier
and simpler results. When punitive damages are assessed, a manufac-
turer may invest in safety beyond the point at which the cost of such
investment equals the benefit in the reduction of consumer losses.3 7
Thus, Professor Ellis' description of the effects of increasing punitive
damage awards shows that the number of harmful acts and of small,
fuel-efficient cars will decrease:38 "more resources will be consumed in
automobile manufacturing"; 39 these cars will, indeed, be safer;40 but
prices will be higher, and "revenues to manufacturers will be lower...
as a consequence, aggregate welfare will be reduced." 41 Similar effects
can be predicted for all those "engaged in activities where punitive
damages are assessed . -4 Uncertainty over the criteria and meas-
ure of punitive damages exacerbates the effect.43
It should not be forgotten that Professor Ellis predicts welfare
losses from the expansion of liability. However, it requires a very clear
appreciation of the concept of "welfare" in economics-a devotion to
the welfare triangle approaching the religious-to convert the abstract
conception of welfare into an imperative of social policy. It is under-
standable that, given these implications, courts have expanded rather
than restricted enterprise liability. Why should not cars or other prod-
35. Supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
36. I am indebted to A. Mitchell Polinsky for emphasizing this point.
37. A manufacturer will find it advantageous to invest in this manner universally under a
strict liability standard or under a negligence standard where there is error in the determination of
negligence. Ellis, supra note 3, at 47-48.




42. Id at 50.
43. Id
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ucts be safer? Certainly the Pinto victims would have preferred safer
cars. Indeed, surely current owners of Pintos would prefer their cars to
be safer and wish that they had been less cost-conscious at the time of
purchase. Should it be the role of the judiciary to protect these con-
sumers willing to accept the risk of incineration? It would require an
extraordinarily firm commitment to the principles of individual liberty
and autonomy to deny liability or the recovery of punitive damages in
such cases. Indeed, if the principal consequence of expanding liability
and multiplying damages is safer products, why should the trend be
stopped?
Of course, it is possible as an empirical matter that, in each of the
varied circumstances in which enterprise liability has been expanded or
punitive damages awarded, consumers make no investments to reduce
losses. Since the announcement of the Coase theorem, however, it has
been more typical to consider liability questions as reciprocal in nature;
to regard the effective margin for the choice of a liability rule as involv-
ing investments of both affected parties which are complementary over
some range but are substitutes at the liability margin.44 Thus, Figure I
describes the production of safety or accident avoidance as a function
ofjoint factors, investments by a manufacturer, M, and by a consumer,
C. Familiarly,45 the optimum allocation of investments between manu-
facturer and consumer is that point tangent to the highest output iso-
quant, So, at which the investment by the manufacturer is M. and by
the consumer is C.. A liability or damage rule that encourages greater
investment by the manufacturer, say Mr,46 will lead to a lower optimal
investment by the consumer, Cl.47 Welfare will be reduced. More im-
portantly, however, the production of safety will fall from output iso-
quant S, to output isoquant S,.48
44. See Coase, supra note 29, at 2, 12-13 (both parties may be said to "cause" an accident).
45. See generally J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 278-88 (2d ed. 1980)
(at any given budget, the highest obtainable output occurs where the iso-cost line is tangent to an
output isoquant). For an application of this analytical technique to liability rules, see Brown,
Toward an Economic Theory of Liabiliy, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 324-27 (1973).
46. A change in the liability rule may lead to greater investment by the manufacturer and
lower investment by the consumer if it (I) requires the introduction of a specific device or invest-
ment; (2) imposes greater than compensatory damages (such as punitive damages); or (3) reduces
the standard of care required of consumers. Of course, contributory negligence is likely to be
defined quite differently under negligence and strict liability regimes.
47. Thus, the relative prices of M and C (indicated by the slope of MC) remain constant. To
simplify matters, long term effects on input prices are ignored.
48. For expositional convenience, the Figure describes total investment in product safety
relative to other product characteristics as fixed (at the distance of MC from the origin). The
result that the level of safety produced by the sum of manufacturer and consumer investments will












Quantity of Consumer Investments
Figure I
It is this implication that is ignored in the analyses of enterprise
liability. If manufacturer and consumer investments are substitute fac-
tors in the production of safety or accident avoidance, then increasing
the liability of manufacturers will lead to a decrease, not an increase, in
safety. Cars will be "safer" in some mechanical sense. Manufacturers
will invest more in automobile safety, but the total output of safety or
accident avoidance will decline. There will result not too much safety,
but too little safety, because rational consumers will diminish their in-
vestments in safety and the joint product will decline.
At MC , the manufacturer has increased its investment in safety,
and the consumer, because he optimizes costs and benefits, has de-
creased his investment in safety. At MoCo, however, the marginal
products of manufacturer and consumer investments were proportional
to their prices, while at MIC they are not. Thus, although at the new
positioft the manufacturer's investment has increased, the total output
of safety has fallen because of the influence of the decline in the margi-
nal product of the consumer's investment. The analyses of enterprise
liability and punitive damages, in contrast, by assuming that consumer
decline, however, is quite general as long as manufacturer investments are a sufficiently good
substitute for consumer investments.
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investments in safety are unimportant, present the safety production
decision as a corner solution, M. Thus, the only effect of expanding
enterprise liability is to shift point M upwards and to make products
safer.
The implication that the expansion of enterprise liability reduces
safety is not an analytic result. The extent to which consumer invest-
ments are significant at the accident margin, and whether or not the
legal standards influencing consumer investments are efficiently de-
fined remain empirical questions.49 Thus, I know of no modern analyst
of enterprise liability who is clearly mistaken. Nevertheless, the ab-
sence of any discussion of these effects in the great majority of analyses
of enterprise liability is noteworthy. It is very hard to believe that con-
sumer investments are irrelevant in every area to which enterprise lia-
bility has been extended. Consumer investments, of course, are more
subtle than manufacturer investments and are much more difficult to
identify and measure. However, the few empirical studies that have
considered consumer investments with any care-Peltzman's study of
automobile safety regulation5" and my study of consumer product war-
ranties5 1 -have shown consumer investments to be significant determi-
nants of accident avoidance.
III.
It is speculation to link an intellectual movement as apparently broad
and deep as is enterprise liability to the acceptance of an empirical as-
sumption that I guess to be wrong. It is peculiar, however, for econo-
mists to concur almost universally that safety, as opposed to most other
products at the liability margin, is a unitary rather than a joint product.
The purpose of papers such as that of Professor Ellis must be to per-
suade its readers (most importantly, the courts). Professor Ellis demon-
strates convincingly the absence of theoretical justification for punitive
damage judgments. But the success of the theory of enterprise liability
has derived from persuasion of a different sort: the insinuation of cer-
tain empirical "truths."
49. I discuss in more detail evidence of the determinants of accident avoidance and the con-
cept of the "accident margin" in G. Priest, The Best Evidence of the Effect of Product Liability
Law on the Accident Rate (unpublished manuscript forthcoming in 91 YALF L.J.).
50. Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation. 83 J. POL. ECON. 677, 682-83,
721-24 (1975).
51. Priest, supra note 7.
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